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VIRGINIA IS FOR LOVERS1 AND DIRECTORS:
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
IN VIRGINIA AND DELAWARE
LAURENCE V. PARKER, JR.∗
ABSTRACT
Virginia and Delaware have different approaches to a director’s
fiduciary duties. The Virginia Stock Corporation Act imposes a deferential
subjective standard of conduct that allows the more-frequent application
of its business judgment rule. Virginia courts have followed the Virginia
Stock Corporation Act and have shown even more deference to the
decisions of directors than the Virginia Stock Corporation Act may
require. In addition, Virginia courts have been reluctant to hold that
additional constituencies, beyond the corporation and shareholders as a
class, are owed fiduciary duties. Finally, Virginia courts have not imposed
“enhanced scrutiny” on the decisions of directors involving hostile
takeovers or changes of corporate control analogous to those fashioned by
Delaware in Unocol Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. Virginia does not impose fiduciary
duties between shareholders or between the board and minority
shareholders, while Delaware has fashioned such duties. The statutory
and judicial deference in Virginia, the narrower set of constituencies to
attack a director’s action or inaction, and the absence of any enhanced
scrutiny in the hostile takeover and change of control context gives
Virginia a strong argument that it is more director-friendly than
Delaware.

1

The longtime tag line of the Virginia Tourism Corporation. See Official Tourism
Website of the Commonwealth of Virginia, http://www.virginia.org/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2011).
∗
Laurence V. Parker, Jr. Partner, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia; J.D.,
University of Richmond School of Law, 2003; M.B.A., The Robins School of Business,
University of Richmond, 2003; B.A., University of Virginia, 1995.
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INTRODUCTION
The deferential interpretation of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act
(VSCA) by Virginia’s courts gives Virginia an argument that it is more
director-friendly than Delaware. VSCA was carefully crafted to ensure the
frequent application of the statutory business judgment rule.2 In addition,
the rule itself is subjective, not objective.3 Virginia’s courts have not only
followed VSCA, but they have also been reluctant to hold that additional
constituencies are owed fiduciary duties or to create enhanced standards of
review.4
Part I of this Article discusses contrasts between Virginia and
Delaware that help demonstrate: (1) in Delaware, the board and majority
shareholders owe the minority shareholders fiduciary duties,5 while
Virginia has not adopted this approach;6 (2) in Delaware, the board of an
insolvent corporation owes fiduciary duties to the corporation’s creditors,7
but Virginia has not yet held that directors of an insolvent corporation owe
fiduciary duties to creditors;8 (3) the standard for evaluating a director’s
duties in Virginia is subjective,9 whereas in Delaware the test is
objective;10 (4) in Delaware, a board taking steps to resist a hostile
takeover attempt is held to the “enhanced scrutiny” standard articulated in
2

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (2006). Virginia’s statutory business judgment rule is
cross-referenced four times in the VSCA to clarify that it is the proper standard to apply
to directors: § 13.1-646 (2010) (regarding the issuance of share options), § 13.1-692
(2006) (regarding the determination that distributions were improper), § 13.1-727.1
(2006) (regarding Virginia’s affiliated transactions statute), and § 13.1-728.9 (2006)
(regarding Virginia’s control share acquisition statute).
3
See infra Section IV.
4
There are, of course, other factors that support the argument that Virginia may be
more director-friendly than Delaware, but this Article focuses primarily on fiduciary
duties. For example, one could argue that Delaware’s statutory limit on exculpation—no
elimination of liability for claims that arise from the duty of loyalty—has resulted in
some interesting reasoning in Delaware cases and may be less favorable than Virginia’s
exculpation provision. Compare VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2006), with DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). This is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
5
See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Allied
Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923).
6
See, e.g., Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 288 (Va. 1999);
Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Va. 2009) (quoting Am. Gen. Ins. Co.
v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Va. 1980)).
7
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns. Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
8
See Trace Mountain Prod., Inc. v. Special Data, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 146, 147-48
(1994) (fiduciary duties may be owed to creditors following dissolution in Virginia).
9
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (2006) (requiring “good faith business judgment”).
10
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
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Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,11 whereas in Virginia the board is
held to a lesser statutory business judgment standard;12 and (5) Delaware
has adopted enhanced duties for the board where the board has put the
corporation on the market, known as “Revlon Duties,”13 while Virginia has
expressly rejected these “Revlon Duties.”14
Part I of this Article discusses the facts in Willard v. Moneta Building
Supply, Inc.,15 one of the cases that highlights several key differences
between Delaware and Virginia. Part II discusses the constituencies owed
fiduciary duties in Delaware and Virginia when the corporation is solvent.
Part III discusses the instances where creditors are owed fiduciary duties
in Delaware, where creditors may be owed duties in Virginia, and the
limits on those duties. Part IV discusses the standard of conduct for
directors in Delaware and Virginia. Parts V and VI discuss the enhanced
standards of conduct adopted in Delaware that have not been adopted in
Virginia.
I. HOW IS VIRGINIA DIFFERENT? WILLARD V. MONETA BUILDING SUPPLY,
INC. COUNTS A FEW OF THE WAYS
A 1999 case, Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc.,16 contains
several examples of the clear differences between corporate fiduciary
duties in Delaware and Virginia. In Willard, the majority shareholders,
Amerigo and Rose Mary Cappellari, husband and wife, owned 75.2
percent of the shares of Moneta Building Supply, Inc. (Moneta), a Virginia
corporation that owned a building supply business.17 Their son, David,
owned 5.1 percent of the company, and Ronald Willard owned the
remaining 19.7 percent.18 David, who was the President of Moneta,
wanted to purchase his parents’ interest in the company but was not able
to do so because a Stock Purchase Agreement among the shareholders
triggered first refusal rights in favor of all of the shareholders, including
Willard, if David’s parents tried to sell him their shares.19
11

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
WRL Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1995).
13
Named for Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). This case applied Revlon Duties in Delaware for the first time. Id.
14
Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999).
15
Id.
16
Id. But see Poth v. Russey, 281 F. Supp. 2d 814, 826 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that
“[w]hen a corporation approaches insolvency, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts
from the stockholders to the creditors”).
17
Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 280.
18
Id. at 280 & n.2.
19
Id. at 280.
12
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Because of this restriction, David resigned as President and director of
Moneta, but agreed to stay on as a manager until another manager was
located.20 David formed Capps Home & Building Supply, Inc. (Capps)
and caused it to submit an Asset Purchase Agreement to Amerigo and
Rose Mary, who were then the only directors of Moneta, on November 15,
1996. In the agreement, Capps offered to buy Moneta’s assets for
$1,300,000.21 Subsequently, David revised his offer and proposed to
assume Moneta’s liabilities in exchange for a purchase price reduction to
$1,150,000.22 The offer would remain open until November 23, 1996.23
Amerigo and Rose Mary, in their capacities as members of the board of
directors, elected to accept the offer subject to shareholder approval and
some additional changes in the Asset Purchase Agreement. They called a
shareholder meeting for December 20, 1996, to vote on the Asset Purchase
Agreement, and did not make any voting recommendation.24 On
December 10, 1996, Willard submitted a counter offer to purchase
Moneta’s assets for $1,550,000, but indicated the offer would expire on
December 13, 1996.25 Moneta’s Board did not reject the Willard offer and
encouraged Willard to bring it up at the December 20 shareholder
meeting.26 Willard increased his offer to $1,750,000 before the
shareholder meeting, but requested an additional thirty days to determine
whether an even higher price was warranted.27 At the shareholder meeting,
Amerigo and Rose Mary voted to approve the Capps transaction, David
abstained, and Willard voted against the proposal. 28
After completing the transaction with the Capps, Willard filed a
derivative action on Moneta’s behalf against Amerigo, Rose Mary, David
and Capps, alleging, among other things, that the directors of Moneta
breached their fiduciary duties in approving the sale to Capps, and that the
sale was a conflict of interest transaction.29 Willard requested that the sale
to Capps be voided and sought damages, constructive trust over Capps’
income, and an award of expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 30 The trial
20

Id.
Id. at 281.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 282.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 282-83.
30
Id.
21
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court dismissed each of Willard’s claims, causing Willard to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.31
Willard appealed and alleged that Amerigo and Rose Mary breached
their duty to maximize the sale price, urging the court to hold that
directors of Virginia corporations owe Revlon Duties.32 Willard also
asserted that the directors of Moneta breached their duty of loyalty
because the transaction with Capps involved a conflict of interest, and that
the directors of Moneta should not be able to avoid their fiduciary duties
as directors by not making a recommendation in their capacities as
directors and then voting to approve the transaction as shareholders.33
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court’s ruling,
avoided creating fiduciary duties between majority and minority
shareholders,34 clarified that Virginia’s standard of director conduct is
measured by a subjective, not an objective standard,35 and declined to
adopt Revlon Duties.36 The salient facts of Willard—a minority
shareholder who offered a higher price disputing the sale to the son of the
directors at a lower price—seemed to weigh heavily in favor of Mr.
Willard; reasonable people argued that the court could have been true to
the deference shown to directors in VSCA but come to a different
conclusion in Willard.37 Despite this sentiment, the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Willard showed that, not only does Virginia have a deferential
statute in VSCA, but Virginia’s courts also provide directors broad
deference.
II. DUTIES OWED TO THE CORPORATION, SHAREHOLDERS, AND MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS
In Delaware, a board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the
corporation,38 the shareholders,39 and the minority shareholders;40 and a
31

Id. at 283.
Id.; see infra Part VI.
33
Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 286-88.
34
Id. at 288.
35
Id. at 284.
36
Id.
37
In fact, the leading commentator on Virginia corporate law called aspects of the
Willard case “puzzling.” See ALLEN C. GOOLSBY, GOOLSBY ON VIRGINIA CORPORATION
LAW 177 (Matthew Bender ed., 2002).
38
See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
39
Id.
40
See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176, 1180 (Del.
1995) (recognizing the rights of minority shareholders on issues of fairness and fair price
analysis).
32
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majority or controlling shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the minority
shareholders,41 especially in transactions that result in a change of control
of the corporation.42 The fiduciary duties of directors and controlling
shareholders include the duties of care and loyalty.43
However, the directors and controlling shareholders are subject to
different standards of review. In most instances, when assessing the duties
owed to a corporation or its shareholders, the board of directors of a
Delaware corporation is entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule:44
The [business judgment] rule operates as both a procedural guide for
litigants and a substantive rule of law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company. The presumption initially attaches to a
director-approved transaction within a board's conferred or apparent
authority in the absence of any evidence of fraud, bad faith, or self45
dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment.

The protection of the business judgment rule, however, is not absolute:
To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes
the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their
challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary
duty—good faith, loyalty or due care. If a shareholder plaintiff fails to
meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to
protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make,
and our courts will not second-guess these business judgments. If the
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the
proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the
46
“entire fairness” of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.
41

Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch.

1923).
42

See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-17 (Del.
1994); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 174, at *36-43 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
43
“Good faith” is not a separate fiduciary duty but a component of the duty of
loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
44
Anti-takeover measures, which are subject to the standard in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and sale of the enterprise, which is subject to
the duties outlined in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986), are two notable exceptions to the application of the business judgment rule.
45
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (internal citations
omitted).
46
Id. (internal citations omitted). While following Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695
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When a majority or controlling shareholder exercises its majority
power to receive benefits to the detriment of the minority shareholder,
Delaware courts have held that the majority shareholder owes the minority
shareholder a fiduciary duty.47 In this situation, a majority shareholder is
not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. Instead, entire
fairness is the standard of review.48 “[T]he ultimate burden of proof is on
the majority shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the transaction is fair.”49 To demonstrate unfairness of the transaction, the
plaintiff must first “allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation or other
items of misconduct.”50 In addition, the controlling shareholder may shift
the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair.51 This
may be done if there has been “an approval of the transaction by an
independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority
shareholders.”52
In contrast, in Virginia, the fiduciary duties of directors run to the
corporation and the shareholders as a class, with no duties owed by
directors or majority shareholders to minority shareholders.53 Because
shareholders cannot bring direct claims against an officer or director in
Virginia,54 a director’s duty to the shareholders as a class may not add
(Del. 2009), it is clear that officers of Delaware corporations owe the same fiduciary
duties as directors; however, the extent of the protection the business judgment rule is
unclear. Some commentators have suggested that the business judgment rule should not
apply to officers. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW 439 (2005). Virginia has not addressed whether officers
owe the same fiduciary duties as directors or whether officers may be protected by the
business judgment rule. Virginia does provide for favorable indemnification of officers.
Compare VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 13.1-698 (2006), and 13.1-704(B), with DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 8, § 145 (2011)) and, unlike Delaware, allows for exculpation of officers. Compare
VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-692.1, and DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)). This may allow
Virginia to lay claim to being more favorable to officers than Delaware. This, however, is
a topic for another day.
47
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-22 (Del. 1971).
48
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del. 1994).
49
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
50
Id.
51
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117.
52
Id. However, Delaware courts have held that in transactions where the controlling
shareholder did not stand on both sides of the transaction but merely was selling
alongside the minority that both negotiation by a committee of disinterested directors and
a non-waivable approval by a majority of all outstanding minority shares is required to
shift the burden to the plaintiff. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No.
758-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
53
See, e.g., Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Va. 2009) (quoting
American General Ins. Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Va.
1980)).
54
Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001).
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much to the duty a director owes to the corporation beyond the duty to
fully and fairly disclose material information to the shareholders.55 In most
instances, if a director discharges his duty to the corporation, he probably
has discharged his duties to the shareholders as a class. Further, while not
an issue on appeal, the facts in Willard offered an opportunity for the
Supreme Court of Virginia to hold that majority shareholders owe
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, but it did not do so. After
Willard, in Remora Investments, L.L.C. v. Orr,56 the Supreme Court of
Virginia made clear that there are, in fact, no fiduciary duties between
shareholders in Virginia.57 As a result, a director of a solvent corporation
in Virginia has fewer constituencies to whom he owes fiduciary duties—
the corporation and the shareholders as a class—than his counterparts in
Delaware. This interpretation of the law makes it easier for a director to
understand his duties and leaves fewer avenues to challenge director
action or inaction.
III. CREDITORS
In Delaware, when a corporation becomes insolvent, fiduciary duties
arise in favor of its creditors;58 however, as there is no direct right of
action in favor of the creditors, the claim must be enforced derivatively.59
Delaware courts do not recognize fiduciary duties to creditors when the
corporation is still solvent but in the “zone of insolvency.”60 Delaware
courts believe that the better policy is to encourage the board of a
corporation that is not yet insolvent to “continue to discharge their
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their
business judgment in the best interests of the corporation and for the
benefit of its shareholder owners.”61 Delaware reasoned that finding a
fiduciary duty to creditors when a corporation is in the “zone of
insolvency” may involve:
[U]sing the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist. Creditors
are often protected by strong covenants, liens on assets, and other
negotiated contractual protections. The implied covenant of good faith
55

See, e.g., Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (Va. 1975).
Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845 (Va. 2009).
57
Id. at 848.
58
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
59
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101-02 (Del. 2007).
60
Id. at 101.
61
Id.
56
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and fair dealing also protects creditors. So does the law of fraudulent
conveyance. With these protections, when creditors are unable to prove
that a corporation or its directors breached any of the specific legal
duties owed to them, one would think that the conceptual room for
concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by
inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant. Having
complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm’s creditors, the
board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk
for the benefit of the firm’s equity holders, so long as the directors
comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing
with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s
62
value.

Delaware courts have held that the insolvency of a corporation,
however, “makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any
fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm’s value.”63 For this reason,
Delaware allows the creditors of an insolvent corporation to derivatively
pursue claims that a director has breached his or her fiduciary duty.64
Virginia has not addressed the fiduciary duty to creditors issue
directly. In Luria v. Board of Directors of Westbriar Condominium Unit
Owners Association,65 the Supreme Court of Virginia came close, but the
Luria case was about fraudulent transfers and improper distributions, not
any fiduciary duty to creditors per se.66 In Luria, John Luria was the
developer of the Westbriar Condominium, a 224 unit condominium in
Fairfax, Virginia (Westbriar).67 Mr. Luria owned an interest in several
entities—Jade Westbriar, Inc., Jade WFW, LLC, and Westbriar, LLC—
which were used to build the project and served as declarants under
Westbriar’s condominium declaration.68 By virtue of their position as
declarants under Virginia’s Condominium Act, Mr. Luria’s entities
controlled Westbriar’s condominium owners’ association (the
62

Id. at 100 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
790 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
63
Id. at 102 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
794 n.67); see also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp.,
No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (explaining,
in a simple hypothetical, how a director of an insolvent corporation would pursue a
riskier decision that may result in some residue for shareholders if he believed his duty
was to the shareholders, but would pursue a safer alternative that was likely to cover
some or all of the corporation’s debt if he believed his duty was to the creditors).
64
See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 102.
65
Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837 (Va.
2009).
66
See id.
67
Id. at 838.
68
Id.
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Association) during construction and initial sale of the units.69 The
Exterior Installation and Finishing System (EIFS) was applied to the
exterior of Westbriar in lieu of siding or stucco.70 In June of 1999, Mr.
Luria learned that the design architect, Christian J. Lessard, believed that
caulking and flashing were needed for the EIFS in several areas, and in
October of 2000, Mr. Lessard recommended that a waterproofing engineer
be hired to verify the application of caulking and flashing.71
Mr. Luria caused each of his entities to make distributions and
transfers to him between 1996 and the end of 2002.72 Control of the
Association passed to the unit owners in June of 2002.73 When the
Association hired engineering consultants to identify any warranty claims,
the consultants discovered that there were substantial issues with the EIFS,
and the consultants recommended that all of the EIFS be removed and
replaced.74 The Association brought claims against Mr. Luria, including a
claim that as a manager of Westbriar, LLC, the last entity that served as
declarant before control of the Association shifted to the unit owners, he
breached his fiduciary duty to the Association in its capacity as a creditor
of Westbriar, LLC.75 The claim asserted breach because Mr. Luria made
distributions to himself from Westbriar, LLC when the Association was
owed monies to remove and replace the EIFS.76 The trial court found that,
under the standard in Marshall v. Fredericksburg Lumber Co.,77 Mr. Luria
breached his fiduciary duty to the Association as a creditor of Westbriar,
LLC, and Mr. Luria appealed.78
The Supreme Court of Virginia highlighted its holding in Marshall
that “where there are existing creditors of a corporation the stockholders
will not be permitted, as against those creditors, to withdraw the assets of
the corporation without consideration, whether it be done through a
purchase of stock by the corporation or otherwise.”79 The Marshall case,
which was decided well before the current version of VSCA was adopted,
has been cited as an example of Virginia’s adoption of the “trust fund
69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 839.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
173 S.E. 553 (Va. 1934).
78
Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837, 839
(Va. 2009).
79
Id. (quoting Marshall, 173 S.E. at 557).
70
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doctrine.”80 However, it appears that the actual issue before the court in
Marshall was whether the use of corporate assets to redeem stock for the
benefit of the controlling shareholder’s family members was a fraudulent
transfer.81 The test enunciated in Marshall seems to be similar to the
current statutory test for an improper distribution—that is, a distribution is
prohibited if the corporation is insolvent on a balance sheet test or “would
not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
business”82—and the VSCA’s dissolution provisions that require directors
to make reasonable provisions for payment of claims before approving a
distribution to shareholders.83 In each case, under current law, a director is
not personally liable for the distribution under section 13.1-692 of VSCA
unless he approved the improper distribution without complying with the
standard of conduct in Virginia’s business judgment rule under 13.1-690.84
In addition, the court’s reasoning in Luria suggests that under an unlawful
distribution analysis, like a fraudulent transfer analysis under section 5580 of the Virginia Code,85 the court must first determine whether the
transferor had actual notice of the claimant’s claim at the time of the
challenged distribution.86
Thus, in Luria, the court did not decide whether a manager of an LLC
or a director of a corporation could owe a fiduciary duty to the entity’s
creditors; rather, the court held that it was unnecessary to make that
determination.87 The court ultimately held, because Mr. Luria did not have
actual notice of the issues with the EIFS at the time of the distributions
80

Bank of Am. v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Marshall, 173 S.E. at 556 (stating the appellant alleged that “the [trial] court erred
in holding that the stock sale was a fraud, and in entering a decree requiring the
repayment of the purchase price of the stock”).
82
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653(C)(1) (2006).
83
§ 13.1-746.
84
§ 13.1-692(A). Directors may seek contribution from other directors and recoupment from shareholders under § 13.1-692(B). See also Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r
v. Matyiko, 481 S.E.2d 469 (Va. 1997).
85
See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80.
86
Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837, 840
(Va. 2009). Another case, not involving improper distributions, suggested that Virginia
courts may be reluctant to allow creditors to recover from officers or directors absent
self-dealing. In Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794, 797-98 (E.D.
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and transfers, the Association was not a creditor, and Mr. Luria could not
have owed it fiduciary duties, even if such duties existed in Virginia.88
While the court in Luria did not state that directors owe fiduciary
duties to creditors, it did not rule such duties out entirely. Further, the
operative provision of VSCA, section 13.1-692, states:
A director who votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation
of this chapter or the articles of incorporation is personally liable to the
corporation and its creditors for the amount of the distribution that
exceeds what could have been distributed without violating this chapter
or the articles of incorporation if the party asserting liability establishes
that when taking the action the director did not comply with § 13.189
690.

The italicized language suggests that the General Assembly
specifically expected creditors to be able to recover improper distributions
directly from directors but only if the directors do not satisfy the standard
of conduct in section 13.1-690 of VSCA. While Virginia courts have not
stated that this right to recover arises from a fiduciary duty, directors have
been held responsible for creditors’ claims where the directors approved a
distribution in violation of VSCA.90
Delaware has held that directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when
the corporation is insolvent, and then the claims may only be enforced
derivatively.91 Virginia has a statutory scheme that allows creditors to
recover directly from directors in the narrow instance where the creditor is
harmed by a distribution approved by the director in violation of the
standard of conduct in Virginia’s statutory business judgment rule.92 The
VSCA does not list a creditor among those authorized to pursue a
derivative action against a director;93 therefore, a creditor may not be able
to enforce the broader fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed to the
corporation and its shareholders as a class. However, in Delaware, the
courts have suggested that they would allow creditors to enforce the
broader fiduciary duties of care and loyalty directors owe to the
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corporation via a derivative action.94 In short, in Delaware, creditors of an
insolvent corporation may enforce the full range of fiduciary duties against
directors via a derivative action, but, in Virginia, under current precedent,
creditors may only pursue a direct action to recover an improper
distribution—a much narrower range of creditor remedies against
directors.
IV. SUBJECTIVE VERSUS OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CONDUCT
In Delaware, the standard of care is objective: “directors of a
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances.”95 If the board does not satisfy this standard of conduct,
Delaware does not apply the deferential business judgment standard of
review.96 Delaware has indicated that a failure to meet the standard of care
requires more than simple negligence.97
In Virginia, the General Assembly adopted a subjective standard that
requires a director to “discharge his duties as a director, including his
duties as a member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation.”98 This was a
deliberate effort to avoid the idealized reasonable man standard,99 and
Virginia courts have followed the subjective approach.100 However, in
Willard, the court indicated that it will look favorably upon boards that
engage in an informed and deliberative decision-making process,101
perhaps not that different from what you would expect an objective
reasonable man to pursue. The Willard court held that “[i]f a director acts
in accordance with that standard, Code § 13.1-690(C) provides a ‘safe
harbor’ that shields a director from liability for any action taken as a
director, and for failure to take action.”102 However, the business judgment
rule in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA does not displace common law
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fiduciary duties; it merely provides a safe harbor if a director satisfies the
standard of conduct.103
Thus, the objective Delaware standard and the subjective Virginia
standard differ in material ways and could result in different outcomes
under similar fact patterns. Each approach has its shortcomings. The
Delaware approach can be problematic because it may invite the
application of hindsight bias,104 it is difficult for a trier of fact to apply
consistently, and, if applied literally (for example, for simple negligence),
it may hold directors to an unrealistic standard.105 The Delaware Supreme
Court itself indicated that it may not be perfectly clear what the standard
of conduct is, but simple negligence is not enough to violate the
standard.106 While Virginia’s approach has the virtue of simplicity, a
director who subjectively believes a decision that no reasonable person
would approve is appropriate, could, at least in theory, benefit from the
protection of Virginia’s statutory safe harbor under section 13.1-690(C) of
VSCA. In addition, if a Virginia court emphasizes the decision process, it
could undercut the subjective standard and turn it into a de facto
reasonable man standard. Regardless, most directors would probably
prefer to be judged by a Virginia court applying Virginia’s subjective
standard as opposed to a reasonable man standard applied by any court.
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V. UNOCAL AND THE “ENHANCED SCRUTINY” STANDARD
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,107 the Delaware Supreme
Court adopted an “enhanced scrutiny” standard that a board must satisfy
before the business judgment rule can be applied if a board takes defensive
measures to resist a hostile takeover, reasoning that in such cases “a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.”108 Under the Unocal “enhanced
scrutiny” standard, the board must show that it “had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person’s stock ownership.”109 The defensive measure
must be motivated by “a good faith concern for the welfare of the
corporation and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free
of any fraud or misconduct” and must not arise “solely or primarily out of
a desire to perpetuate [the directors] in office.”110 Finally, the defensive
measure “must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”111
In contrast, in W.L.R. Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,112 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law,
declined to adopt any test based on a common law duty of loyalty and held
that Virginia’s statutory standard, under section 13.1-690 of VSCA, is the
proper standard to apply when reviewing director’s actions in the face of a
hostile takeover attempt.
[T]he Code expressly provides that actions of directors with respect to
issuing rights or options for the purchase of shares of a corporation are
subject to review under the standard articulated in § 690. Similarly, the
Code provides that conduct concerning affiliated transactions ... as well
as transactions involved in control share acquisitions ... are subject to
113
§ 690.
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In addition, the court held that in evaluating conflicts of interest involving
a corporate transaction, section 13.1.691, not the common law, governs.114
In Willard ex rel. Moneta Building Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Building
Supply,115 the case that the Virginia Supreme Court ultimately upheld in
Willard, the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia, cited at length and
found persuasive the trial court’s analysis in W.L.R. Foods, including the
trial court’s determination that Unocal and C-T of Virginia, Inc. v.
Barrett116 were not applicable in Virginia.117 Although the Virginia
Supreme Court did not need to address the Unocal enhanced scrutiny issue
directly in the Willard appeal, in rejecting Revlon Duties it did adopt the
Circuit Court of Bedford County’s reasoning and indicated it will stick
closely to the language of section 13.1-690 of VSCA. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court of Virginia would adopt Unocal
“enhanced scrutiny” if called on to address the question directly.118
So, again, Virginia and Delaware differ in a meaningful way. Where
Delaware presumes that directors may be acting in their own interest in
adopting anti-takeover measures and imposes an enhanced standard of
conduct, Virginia provides directors the deference of its statutory business
judgment rule.
VI. REVLON DUTIES
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.119 and its progeny, imposed additional duties on a
board of directors of a Delaware corporation if the corporation pursues a
change of control transaction “on its own initiative or in response to an
unsolicited offer.”120 A transaction where the target’s stockholders receive
cash or mostly cash, as opposed to stock in a surviving entity, is a change
of control transaction and triggers the board’s Revlon Duties.121 However,
it is not clear exactly what percentage of stock consideration is required to
avoid Revlon Duties.122 Revlon Duties are intended for the “maximization
114
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of the company’s value at sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”123 Once the
corporation pursues a change of control transaction, “[t]he directors’ role
[changes] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.”124
During the period after an acquisition agreement is signed, but before
the transaction closes, Revlon Duties continue.125 Cases like Omnicare,
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.126 emphasize finding the best price even after
a definitive agreement is executed and have made the contractual
“fiduciary out”—an ability to terminate the agreement if a superior
proposal later materializes—a staple in acquisition agreements.127
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Virginia specifically declined to
adopt Revlon Duties for directors of Virginia corporations in Willard.128
Instead, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a board must evaluate the
“quantity and quality of the offers” and a board is “not required to accept
an offer merely because it maximize[s] the purchase price.”129 The court
reasoned that a strict application of Revlon Duties would mean that only
one offer was in the best interests of the corporation and “would erode the
deference afforded a director's discharge of duties” under section 13.1-690
of the VSCA.130 In fact, in Willard, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties where the
corporation ultimately accepted the lower of two offers.131 The board
accepted the lower offer where the higher offer was received late, would
require a delay in closing, and imposed a risk that the party making the
lower offer would open his own competing business in the interim,
thereby harming the value of the corporation’s business.132
When a Virginia court evaluates whether a board of directors has
discharged its fiduciary duties in accepting a lower price, the key factor is
whether the board followed a deliberative process that allowed the board
in good faith to reach the conclusion that, based on qualitative factors
other than price, the offer that included a lower price was the better
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offer.133 In evaluating an offer, a director is entitled to rely on reports and
opinions prepared by: (1) officers or employees of the corporation; (2)
committees of the board; or (3) committees of advisors, including
investment bankers, lawyers, accountants, or other persons, on matters that
the director believes, in good faith, are within the person’s professional or
expert competence.134
Virginia courts have not addressed whether the board of a Virginia
corporation that is an acquisition target must have the right to terminate an
acquisition agreement if, after executing a definitive acquisition
agreement, an apparently superior offer emerges. For example, if the board
of a Virginia corporation that is an acquisition target (1) holds a
reasonable auction process, (2) uses a reputable investment banking firm
to market the corporation to a meaningful number of financial and
strategic bidders, and (3) makes a decision on selecting a bidder that is
informed by a fairness opinion from its financial advisor or investment
bank, then it is possible that a Virginia court following Willard would hold
that the board did not need a “fiduciary out” to pursue a subsequent bid;
the acquisition agreement would be enforceable even if it did not include a
“fiduciary out” and a subsequent bidder offered a higher price because the
board followed a reasonable process and had no duty to pursue the
absolute highest price.135
However, even after Willard, if a target’s board has discussed a sale
with one suitor, but there are other suitors that may have an interest and a
similar ability to consummate who are not contacted, the board of a
Virginia corporation would be wise to bargain for a “fiduciary out”
because the process it used to select a suitor may not be sufficient. Until
there is additional case law in Virginia, the safest course of action is for
Virginia corporations that are acquisition targets to bargain for “fiduciary
outs” in acquisition agreements. The good news is that these provisions
have become so commonplace that it is routine for a target’s board to
request them and out of the ordinary for a suitor to resist them.136 We may
one day discover that Virginia boards do not need the broad “fiduciary
out” that is common in acquisition agreements because of Delaware case
133
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law. In the meantime, the boards of Virginia corporations can and should
benefit from the practice of including this language in acquisition
agreements.
Revlon Duties and the duties of directors of a Virginia corporation may
not be as different as they seem when comparing Willard and Revlon.
There is room in the Willard holding to move toward a Delaware-like
standard. While it clearly will never focus on price alone, the Willard
court’s focus on process could lead to Revlon-like results in the future. In
addition, although Delaware’s Revlon Duties clearly impose a price
maximization duty on directors, Delaware does not require a board to
blindly pursue the highest price without considering other factors.137 The
Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that:
[i]n assessing the bid and the bidder's responsibility, a board may
consider, among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of the
offer; its fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for
the offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of
illegality; the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on
other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship
to general shareholder interests; the risk of nonconsumation; the basic
stockholder interests at stake; the bidder's identity, prior background
and other business venture experiences; and the bidder's business plans
138
for the corporation and their effects on stockholder interests.

Delaware has also made it clear that there is no single way to satisfy
Revlon Duties and that Revlon Duties do not require each board to follow
a strictly defined set of best practices.139 Nevertheless, when Revlon and
its progeny are compared to Willard, it is clear that the emphasis on price
is greater in Delaware, and that Delaware courts are less deferential to a
board’s decision to accept a lower offer than courts in Virginia.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Virginia and Delaware have different approaches to a
director’s fiduciary duties. The VSCA imposes a deferential subjective
standard of conduct that allows the more frequent application of its
business judgment rule. Virginia courts have followed the VSCA and have
shown even more deference to the decisions of directors than the VSCA
may require. In addition, Virginia courts have been reluctant to hold that
137
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additional constituencies, beyond the corporation and shareholders as a
class, are owed fiduciary duties. Finally, Virginia courts have not imposed
“enhanced scrutiny” on the decisions of directors involving hostile
takeovers or changes of corporate control analogous to those fashioned by
Delaware in Unocal and Revlon. Virginia does not impose fiduciary duties
between shareholders or between the board and minority shareholders,
while Delaware has fashioned such duties. The statutory and judicial
deference in Virginia, the narrower set of constituencies to attack a
director’s action or inaction, and the absence of any enhanced scrutiny in
the hostile takeover and change of control context gives Virginia a strong
argument that it is more director-friendly than Delaware.

